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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to connect Leibniz’s and Toulmin’s conceptions about practical and 
deliberative rationality. When trying to rationally justify contingent judgments Leibniz, like Toulmin, defends a 
weighing argumentative method. Thus, in Leibniz we can discern the balance between the legitimate demands of 
formal models of rationality and the lessons of a practice “situated” on a historical, social, and evaluative context 
(theoria cum praxi). 
 





Usually, G.W. Leibniz has been considered as a typical example of rationalist thinkers of XVII 
century, joined to ‘new science’ and deep trust in human reason. ‘Nothing happens without a 
sufficient reason’, as prays the known principle of his philosophy. This is also the first Toulmin’s 
approach to the philosopher of Leipzig, as pointed out, for example, in his excellent book 
Cosmopolis (1990[2001]). However, Leibniz was far from the classical model of rationalist, à la 
Descartes, but a rationalist with a lot of tones and shades. Stephen Toulmin himself regards 
Leibniz as what it could be called a ‘qualified rationalist’: 
 
(…) Although he continued to advocate Unity as a general program, Leibniz saw the world made up of 
multiple levels of units: not all of them had the same theoretical status as ‘particles’ in Newton’s dynamics. 
Instead, he recognized differences of complexity in the activities —even the perception— of different 
natural systems, and he referred to them as so many distinct kinds of ‘monads’ within his overall System of 
the World. (Toulmin, 2001[2003], p. 136) 
 
 In Leibniz, we cannot establish a clear cut distinction between his life, his public 
activities, on the one hand, and his thought and his philosophical reflections, on the other. This 
issue has been also remarked on by Toulmin since Leibniz’s ‘rationalist dream’ is the outcome of 
an age characterized by theological disputes, religious wars, and political upheavals (Toulmin, 
1990[2001], pp. 145 ff.). 
 At this point it is beneficial to recall that, in Leibnizian thought, theory and praxis are 
strongly tied, mutually co-involved, according to his known motto ‘theoria cum praxi.’ This 
means that the theoretical reason is guided by the necessities of the practical reason in the same 
way that the practical reason clarifies its goals with the developments and the imperatives of the 
theoretical reason. That is the case with Toulmin’s philosophical standpoints too (Toulmin, 
2001[2003], p. 247). 
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 Furthermore, the universe of human praxis is headed by the factum of the contingent, 
those that could be in another way;1 that is, the realm of liberty, morals, politics and, in sum, of 
history. Starting from Aristotelian practical philosophy, Leibniz clearly objects the determinism, 
as pointed out in his criticism to Spinoza’s Ethics: ‘If all things exist necessarily … moral 
philosophy would be destroyed.’ In short, the contingency is not only a metaphysical principle 
but basically a moral one, since it makes possible the freedom of individuals and, thus, the non 
forecast of their actions. In Leibniz’s opinion, human action is not only free but is expressed in a 
great variety (pluralism) and human history, individual and social, is up to it, constituting the 
contingent par excellence.2 Besides, this sphere of the contingent, of free human action, 
manifested in history, is characterized by the conflict, the contradiction of interests, and the 
difference. This complex approach to reality is what Leibnizian rationalism copes with.  
 In the following, I present some of the key elements of Leibniz’s conceptions about 
practical and deliberative rationality and their connection to Toulmin’s ones. Both uphold a type 
of rationality in which the principles must be joined to the particular and contingent, to what it is 
characteristic of the case and its circumstance. That is, a ‘situated’ rationality, namely, a 
historical one, linked to differing interests and values, and bonded to practice and experience 
(reasonableness in Toulmin’s terms). 
 
1. THE MAXIM PROJECT OF LEIBNIZ 
 
Faced with the challenge of scepticism, Leibniz suggests a two-way solution. The first and best 
known is a rigorous and strict formalization of thought, which Fernando Gil calls ‘the maxim 
project.’ It involves the idea of a Characteristica univeralis, a conceptual logic —which was 
later to inspire Frege’s Begriffsschrift— that would allow for only one valid solution from the 
premises under consideration: «instead of discussing, let’s calculate».3 It is the working model 
for geometry and arithmetic; the method of deductive logic, which is the art of reason in the 
domain of the necessary —where principles, such as that of non-contradiction, applied to the 
possible or to essences, work (NN.EE. I, ch. 1, §5; Monadology 31; Theodicy 44, 169). It is also 
the dream of Rationalism, which aspires to a universal method, a perfect language and a unitary 
system of Nature, with the mathematics model as its starting point: 
 
But there are also other cases in which a judge of controversies other than reason is equally unnecessary, 
since truth can be clearly found by precise paths and commonly known ways, as it is the case with 
geometric and arithmetical issues about the magnitude of things. Certainly, there is no need of judge in 
 
1
 This Leibnizian support of the contingency was in a moment when theological controversies about free will and 
predestination are changing into the polemics on the liberty and the natural determinism. The scientific 
developments showed a universe tied to general laws that allow forecasting the natural facts so, if human being is a 
part of the natural world, his actions has to be subjected to the same causal determinism. Leibniz adopts 
mechanicism, up to a point, but strongly rejects the absolute determinism in any form. 
2
 Leibniz affirms, criticizing art. 6 of Descartes’ Principia: ‘We have free will not when we perceive, but when we 
act’ (GP IV, 357). 
3
 In this regard, Leibniz shows himself to be the clearest precursor of modern formal logic, which becomes the 
dominant conception in many contemporary readings of this philosopher. On the one hand, the idea of a 
Characteristica universalis is a precedent of symbolic logic; and, on the other, his raciocinator calculus is a 
precedent of contemporary conceptions of mathematic-algebraic logic.  
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calculus; it is enough to carefully enumerate without omitting anything for the conclusion to follow 
necessarily, in all evidence, as in the case of Geometry.4  
 
 In this approach, the search for a universal and perfect language plays a prominent role, 
as Toulmin has highlighted in his works. That is, the development of a universal language by 
means of symbols and words that drive reason and where mistakes are merely calculation faults. 
However, this research was not original of Leibniz since there was an important tradition 
in that sense. We have not to forget Toulmin’s viewpoint that Leibniz was a product of his age. 
In fact, Leibniz knew the works of the forerunners in the search for a perfect language: Ramon 
Llull, John Dee, Pedro Bermudo, George Dalgarno, Atanasio Kircher or John Wilkins (Eco, 
1993). In Leibniz, the project of a universal or rational language would have the advantage that 
the symbol, the Characteristica, does not only represent directly ideas and cognitive contents 
(like Egyptian ideograms or Chinese writing), but allows reasoning in a way similar to arithmetic 
calculation: ‘Cum Deus calculate et cogitationem exercet, fit mundus.’5 
As pointed out by Marcelo Dascal, the cognitive role of language as an instrument of 
reason is a precedent of modern theses about the identification of language and thought (Fodor, 
Dretske). Clearly, Leibniz affirms that thought is basically symbolic (Dascal, 1978, 1987; 
Rutherford, 1995).  
Nevertheless, Leibniz recognizes the great gnoseological and moral value of natural 
languages as proven by his important etymological studies. One of the principles of his thought 
is the positive appraisal of diversity and plurality —as commented further on.  
 As remarked by Concha Roldán in her excellent work ‘Langue naturelle et éthique 
rationnelle’ (in press), the plurality of languages is not only unavoidable but necessary from the 
ethical Leibnizian project which wants to show the complexity and metaphysical richness of 
individuals. 
 Thus, from a pluralist Leibnizian perspective, the diversity of natural languages is 
richness, with an enormous value, and the Characteristica would be an auxiliary language in 
order to help our comprehension of the world and our understanding of others6:’(…) cuius 
auxilio diversae nationes animi sensa comunicare et quae scripsit alter in sua quisque lingua 
legere queat …’ 7 
 Summarizing, the ‘maxim project’ does not finish Leibnizian ‘theoria cum praxi.’ 
Specifically, the formal-calculistic model is clearly insufficient for contingent matters (moral, 
juridical, political, etc.), and Leibniz himself acknowledges this: 
 
Thus the form of disputation has been shown to be necessary in necessary matters where eternal truths 
occur but not in contingent matters where the most probable must be chosen. (…) For the common saying 







 Brief commentaries on the judge of controversies or the balance of reason and norm of the text § 58 (A, VI, 1). 
5
 Dialogue de la conexión entre les mots et les choses, 1677 (A VI, 4, 22). 
6
 La place d’autrui principle is a main rule of Leibnizian practical reason: put yourself in the place of others (La 
place d’autrui, 1679. A VI, 3, 903904). 
7
 De numeris characteristicis ad linguam universalem constituendam (A VI, 4, 264). 
8
 Letter to Gabriel Wagner on the value of logic, 1696 (L 467).  
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2. LEIBNIZIAN MINIMAL METHOD 
 
In Leibniz we also find a ‘minimal method’ when trying to rationally justify contingent 
judgments. As remembered by Ezequiel de Olaso (1995), Leibniz was the philosopher of the 
diversity, pluralism and tolerance, and always considered positively the controversies, upon the 
condition that they will be regulated by means of a method. It seems without a doubt that debate 
and controversy are basic, extended, and typically ways of human interaction. The controversies 
are a type of polemics that hold an intermediate position between discussion and dispute, but 
which would not be reduced to mere unsolvable conflicts of preferences. 
At this point a dialogic perspective of analysis is required; one that does not unleash wild 
rhetoric, and one that serves to justify rationality in contingent judgments, especially, in 
situations of conflict —the method mentioned by Olaso. There is no doubt that dialogue (among 
churches, states, philosophers, and cultures) is a key to Leibniz’s theoretical and practical 
enterprises —the so-called Leibnizian ‘linguistic turn.’ Similarly, the contemporary debate about 
moral problems dealing with scientific-technical research, with professions, with the clash 
among cultures, etc. stirs up the concern about practice, moving us away from abstract moral 
theories and closer to the case method. This issue approximate Leibniz to Toulmin and Jonsen’s 
theses about ‘new casuistry’ (Toulmin and Jonsen, 1988), a kind of moral reasoning related to 
circumstances and situations, as a reaction against the oversimplification of moral realm and 
against the ‘tyranny of principles’ (Toulmin, 1981). They reject ‘moral geometry’ but rather 
preferring ‘practical wisdom.’ The new casuistry does not offer ‘prescriptions’ or ‘recipes’ but 
upholds the necessity of analysis, weighing and valuation of circumstances; it is, basically, 
‘prudent.’ In the case of Leibniz, justice is inconceivable apart from prudence. Justice, in this 
sense, would be no more than a form of prudence that avoids hurting others and fosters Common 
Good (the basic principle of his ethical-political thought).9 
So, neither a mechanical application of principles nor abandonment to passions in judgment 
serves as a valid instrument for this type of analysis. Leibnizian —and also that of Toulmin and 
Jonsen— is rather a proposal, like Aristotle’s phronesis, which is placed on an intermediate or 
pragmatic level, or a blandior ratio; i.e., non-rigid forms of reasoning which are crucial in most 
of Leibniz’s theoretical and practical enterprises, without a clear line between them: 
-The importance of presumption and interpretation in legal domain. 
-The gradualist approach to religious differences and the search for a re-unification of the 
churches (Irenism).  
-The idea of ‘defensibility’ (reasonableness) in Theodicy versus naïve Lutheran literalism. 
-The understanding of science as a guided, cooperative and institutionalized activity. 
-Ethical consequentialism, close to some utilitarian approaches. 
-Political pragmatism, etc. 
Therefore, Leibniz does not consider a mere calculistic method (the mere sum of 
probabilities, for example)10 to be a suitable instrument for the analysis of contingent matters —
in the way that classic deductive logic is for necessary things.  
 
9
 Elementa Juris Naturalis (A VI, 1, 459-465; L 134, 137). 
10
 There is a tension, even some confusion, in Leibniz between the concept of probability, linked to juridical tools as 
presumption, and the notion of prudence. The former has an algorithmic character, as a mathematical model, to deal 
with uncertainty; whereas the latter has more to do with the relational and gradual ideas of proportionality and 
similarity. Somehow, prudence would be characterized by ‘utility’, weighed with probability, without being reduced 
to it. 
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For Dascal (2001), Leibniz would be an example of a ‘soft rationalist’, who has abandoned 
an arrogant and totalitarian approach to reason. In Leibniz, we can discern, using Toulmin’s 
terms, the balance between the legitimate demands of formal models of rationality and the 
lessons of a practice ‘situated’ on a historical, social and evaluative context. 
This weighing ‘method’ would include: 
-rules of a heuristic type (such as presumptions);11 
-the determination of the status quaestionis of argumentative process; 
-paying attention to the descriptive terms of other’s position; 
-considering the epistemic reliability of premises; 
-assessing the relevance of the elements of discourse;12 
-taking into account analogies and comparisons; 
-specifying the burden of proof. 
This picture of argumentative weighing method fits with Toulmin’s criticism on 
argumentations —in The Uses of Argument— considered as merely formal-deductive inferences, 
reacting against narrow and classical logical approaches to ordinary reasoning. This way we can 
make reasonable, although defeasible, decisions, which are non-definite and non-stringent. Thus, 
returning to the question in relation to moral dilemmas or conflicts: given certain circumstances 
(with specific particular elements, with different agents involved), the choice in a particular 
moment for one certain precept or principle over another does not cancel the one being rejected. 
Even if it weakens it, the now rejected norm can be adopted under different circumstances.13 In 
other words, the non-applied norm still holds a degree of normativity that will fade only insofar 
as it is not being used or in dialectic relation with its use or lack of use in ethical practice —
inviting a gradualist analysis of moral principles and concepts. 
In Leibniz’s work, the ‘scales of reason’ metaphor emerges as the essential weighing 
element for rational argumentation in the domain of the contingent, the praxis, and the particular 
case; scales which, as Dascal says, would no longer have a digital or metrical character (the 
algorithmic project), but would also have a dialectic and comparative character. We say ‘also’ 
because, for Leibniz, these two projects are not incompatible or in opposition. Rather, they are 
complementary. This is precisely Toulmin’s central thesis in Return to Reason; namely, to 
restore the balance between the rationalist ideal of necessity and certainty, on the one hand, and 
ordinary practice and experience, on the other. It would involve a re-equilibrium between 
rhetoric and logic, the case and moral theory. (Toulmin 2001[2003], pp. 250-51). 
 
11
 As any other type of inference, a presumption leads us from a certain amount of already proven or, at least 
accepted, premises to a conclusion, which constitutes the assumed fact. What is characteristic of presumptions is that 
we reach certain conclusions from certain factual information for want of other data, but we have the possibility to 
modify the conclusion if more information is provided. That is to say, it involves a dispensable or revisable 
conclusion, which is the outcome of a weakened type of inference (in which the deductive property of monotonicity 
does not appear). Presumptions are, in general, fundamentally, although not exclusively, based on a probability or 
normality judgment that is the outcome of experience, upon the relation between certain fact (trace-fact or base-fact) 
and a fact that is taken to be true (presumptive fact). 
12
 The notions of ‘epistemic reliability’ as well as that of ‘relevance’ are elements of contemporary theories on 
pragmatics and belief change (Sperber and Wilson; Gärdenfors). In both cases ‘qualitative’ and not merely 
‘quantitative’ or ‘enumerative’ elements of discourse are emphasized. 
13
 This is especially contemplated in the case of legal norms, in which the jurist’s interpretation in favor of a norm 
and against an incompatible one does not eliminate conflict, since it does not necessarily cause its revision or 
derogation. 
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Unlike the calculistic model (the classic logical-deductive one), which gives rise to 
definitive and stringent conclusions (i.e., certainties), the weighing model, as represented by the 
scales of reason, would not provide absolute certainties. However it would provide reasonable 
‘justified inclinations’ in favor of one of the pans of the scale or one of the points of view at 
issue; this amounts to an inclination that is consistently non-definitive, non-conclusive, and 
revisable (incliner sans necessiter). This idea of unbalance plays a fundamental role in Leibniz’s 
metaphor, since to balance would be to concur with the skeptic, just as is the case with Buridan’s 
ass.14 
The concept of weighing, of the balance of reasons, is clearly inspired in the activities of 
the jurists, particularly, in their juris-prudential doings,15 to the extent that Leibniz refers to it as 
‘inventive and juridical logic’ or as ‘the art of the plausible consequences’: 
 
I want to introduce the scales of Law, a new type of instrument with which one cannot estimate wealth and 
precious stones, but, what is more valuable, the weight of reasons. Usually it is said that the one who has 
the supreme faculty of deciding in his hands after pondering all elements must not count, but weigh the 
arguments of those deciding, the stances of the authors, the expressions of those deliberating. (...) In this 
manner, we finally reach the matter —outstandingly useful throughout life— of the tabernacle of 
jurisprudence, where it was so hidden that could scarcely be recognized. In view of this discovery, it should 
indeed be considered that just as mathematicians have exercised logic, that is, the art of reason in 
necessary things in an optimum way and to a greater extent than anyone else, also juriconsultants have 
practiced it in contingent matters.16  
 
This is another agreement between Leibniz and Toulmin since the latter has upheld the 
parallel between logic and jurisprudence, as a starting point of his study of ordinary 
argumentations: 
 
Arguments can be compared with law-suits, and the claims we make and argue for in extra-legal contexts 
with claims made in the courts, while the cases we present in making good each kind of claim can be 
compared with each other. A main task of jurisprudence is to characterise the essentials of the legal 
process: the procedures by which claims-at-law are put forward, disputed and determined, and the 
categories in terms of which this is done. Our own inquiry is a parallel one: we shall aim, in a similar way, 
to characterise what may be called ‘the rational process’, the procedures and categories by using which 
claims-in-general can be argued for and settled. (…) the ‘jurisprudential analogy’ in mind: our subject will 
be the prudential, not simply for jus, but more generally of ratio. (Toulmin 1958[2003], pp. 7-8). 
 
3. PRAGMATISM, PLURALISM AND GRADUALISM 
 
These three characteristics of Leibnizian philosophy are the logical complements to his idea of 
reasonableness. 
We have also mentioned the strong tie among theory and praxis in Leibnizian thought. 
This issue is going to incline Leibniz to an ethical-legal-political consequentialism, far from the 
ethical foundationalism, formalism, and abstraction, as defended by Kant. For Leibniz, the utility 
 
14
 Brief commentaries on the judge of controversies or the balance of reason and norm of the text § 65a (A, VI, 1). 
15
 It is practical wisdom that justifies and decides on juridical matters of experiential and, most of the times, complex 
character; due to the multiplicity of legal sources, the protection of interests in conflict, the indetermination and 
graduality of concepts, gaps, etc. Recall that the young Leibniz starts his intellectual activity precisely in the domain 
of Law.  
16For a balance of Law (C 210). See likewise the above mentioned Letter to Gabriel Wagner, where Leibniz stands 
that nobody has been closer to the pondering balance of reasons than the jurists. 
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and the results of knowledge will be the fundamental principles of sciences in general so he 
indeed maintains an ordering of the sciences by means of their results (effectus) instead of their 
subjects (subjecta).17 
Thus, the praxis does not reduce to a marginal aspect of knowledge nor only refer to the 
realm of applications, but it is comprised as an element that governs and marks out cognitive 
activities. Consequently, Leibniz is a gnoseological anti-foundationalist; in order to justify 
knowledge, we have to see to the coherence of the belief system, or the coherence amongst the 
system and a heap of empirical confirmations (coherentism), or to the set of results obtained by 
applying the theory (pragmatism). Against Cartesian intuitivism and the worship to the distinct 
and clear idea, Leibniz advocates to an approach usually called ‘formalism’ but whose main axle 
is that the known truths system has to be under the test of the internal coherence and the 
coherence with experience facts too (Rescher, 1986, p. 130). 
Leibniz is aware of the complexity, diversity, and plurality of the world, in the historical 
and contingent side as well as in the natural and necessary one. However, this fact is not a 
problem, but a richness, since his principle of plenitude stands that the better world is, in any 
case, the ‘fuller’ world and, therefore, nothing or almost nothing has to be rejected and all or 
almost all can be integrated and harmonize. In sum, Leibniz is interested in positive and 
enrichment aspects presented in all rational reasoning. 
 The ultimate rationale of Leibnizian pluralism is his perspectivism. In the same way that 
each monad reflects the universe from a perspective, each culture represents its own view of the 
world, i.e, a perspective of the same reality: 
 
Just as the same city regarded from different sides offers quite different aspects, and thus appears 
multiplied by the perspective, so it also happens that the infinite multitude of simple substances creates the 
appearance of many different universes. Yet they are but perspectives of a single universe, varied according 
to the points of view, which differ in each monad.18 
 
So, Leibnizian universalism cannot be assimilated to a cosmopolitism without face since 
Leibniz foresees that different cultures preserve their individual character (like monads), at the 
same time that they make up a more complex order that will finish with human discords. 
 Finally, Leibnizian method of rationality, based on comparison and weighing, has been 
interpreted as a typically pragmatic resource (in the sense of linguistic analysis). Therefore, 
heuristic rules, epistemological considerations, and other resources of blandior ratio would 
constitute a type of para-logical theory, which is added to logic in order to offer an account of a 
non-rigorous domain, namely that of argumentation on contingent matters. This is Marcelo 
Dascal’s interpretation, and it stands in opposition to other views that take Leibniz’s model of 
softer rationality as an invitation to ‘widen’ logic. It is this latter approach that I defend: Nihil 
sine ratione → Blandior ratio → Blandior logica.19 
 
17
 De arte inveniendi (C 169) 
18
 Monadology §57 (GP VI, 616) 
19
 In this context I understand logic in a ‘minimal’ way, as the mere representation of certain arguments by means of 
schematizations which help to better understand, even visually, which are the inferentially important points and 
stamp more rigor to a certain set of argumentations. Therefore, logic is not something exclusive of mathematics or 
of the hard sciences, such as physics, but of all domains in which an argumentative process is involved (that is, all 
questions of a practical type). 
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 Beyond appealing to weighing, comparison, and analogy —all of which are mechanisms 
of an indubitable gradual character—, some basic principles of Leibniz’s metaphysics, such as 
the principle of continuity, deal in detail with the gradualist perspective that I defend. There are 
many texts in which we can find this gradualist or continuistic metaphysical approach.20 One of 
the characteristics of this approach is the exclusion of defined leaps, breaks, or cuts in the 
domain of the real: natura non facit saltus. Although Leibniz called this general principle of 
physics and mathematics ‘lex iustitiae’, he did not explicitly apply it to the normative domain; 
and, in logic, he always adopted the bi-valued classic deductive model. Only in some fragments 
(i.e. NN.EE. IV, ch. 16) does he appeal to the need to build a type of logic that accounts for the 
degrees of plausibility. 
 It is also interesting to highlight that Leibniz’s metaphysical idea of graduality (a term, 
which among other things, he also called: a principle of transition, a law of continuity, or a 
principle of change without leap) appears in his mature philosophy, whereas his interest in 
jurisprudence is, as has been already pointed out, rather early. Maybe this chronological 
discordance is part of the reason why Leibniz did not consider this principle in the normative and 
logical domains. 
 In any case, I will here dare to establish a connection between these metaphysical 
principles and Leibniz’s approach to practical rationality. The notions of weighing as well as 
those of comparison and similarity take place in a gradual manner, by means of transitions 
instead of leaps or breaks.  
What has been said serves as an invitation to logically implement Leibniz’s gradualism by 
a fuzzy calculus in which propositions take their truth-value in the interval [0, 1]. Consequently, 
the notion of ‘truth’ can be ‘modulated’, as it happens in ordinary experience and argumentation, 
so that ‘true’ and ‘false’ have lost their static and abstract character.21 
Fuzzy logic does not benefit relativism in any way, but it makes manifest truth’s relational 
character. Thereby the opposition between ‘truth’ and ‘opinion’, which has been a matter of 
concern in Western thought since pre-Socratic times, is rejected as irrelevant and confusing 
(Trillas, Alsina and Terricabras, 1995, p. 40). 
The same is the case with normative notions, which, from the point of view of practical 
deliberation, are of special interest to us. Deontic descriptions of licitness, prohibition and duty, 
in this spirit, are treated as gradual notions. From this perspective, a particular action can have a 
more or less degree of licitness and, to the extent that it is not completely licit, it will have some 
degree of illicitness. The core of this type of analysis is the principle of graduation, according to 
which, when two facts are similar, their juridical treatment must also be similar. This idea is 
clearly due to the above-mentioned Leibnizian principle of transition or continuity (lex iustitiae). 
 
4. RATIONALISM WITHOUT DOGMAS 
 
Concluding, Leibniz and Toulmin would share a kind of soft and tinged rationalism, opened to 
difference, plurality and controversy. When trying to rationally justify contingent judgments 
Leibniz and Toulmin defend a weighing and qualified argumentative method. Thus, in both of 
them we can discern the balance between the legitimate demands of formal models of rationality 
and the lessons of a practice ‘situated’ on a historical, social, and evaluative context (theoria cum 
 
20
 Monadology, Letter to Varignon, Letter to Rémond, Theodicy, NN.EE. 
21
 The relational notion of truth is closely similar to the ontological and moral views of Dewey’s pragmatism. 
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praxi). That is, a way to cope with complexity of life and with its contingency and uncertainty; in 
sum, a rationalism without dogmas. 
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